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The problem of privacy today is no longer-if it ever was-a distinctly legal
problem. On the contrary, the way we think about privacy as legal scholars and
as advocates of legal reform is unlikely to help us to address the more
intractable and important political problems that today surround the "right to be
left alone." To be sure, it is important to look at the ways in which Fourth
Amendment law, employment law, and medical regulations, for example, increas-
ingly authorize deep intrusions into our privacy. It is a great contribution of The
Unwanted Gaze,' Professor Rosen's extremely interesting and provocative book,
that it brings together so many legal domains and forces us to think about their
convergence. But if we want to know what is really going on with privacy
today, we have to step back from our legal analysis and ask what it is in our
society, in our culture-including our legal culture-that is driving these devel-
opments. In short, some realism is in order.
We should start by admitting certain uncomfortable facts. For example, we
might profitably begin by acknowledging the breathtaking disjunction in our
society between public norms and private norms. Take pornography. Millions of
people, apparently, buy or look at pornography on the Internet every month, but
we consider it tremendously embarrassing to admit this sort of thing in public.
If the fact that you have purchased pornography becomes known to the public,
it becomes evidence of the sort that can be used to humiliate or to derail your
judicial nomination. Or again, millions of people have affairs, but in public such
conduct is piously and ostentatiously condemned. If a politician is revealed to
be having an affair, it can jeopardize his political career or lead to a Title VII
action. Now, in a society like this, we must expect invasions of privacy. The
incentives to violate privacy are too large. The desire to see the fakery and
hypocrisy exposed is too great. We want to see that other public figures are
doing the things that we know everyone else is doing. So long as American
society persists in its breathtaking contradiction on this point-its puritanism in
public and its libertarianism in private-there will continue to be invasions of
privacy, despite the best efforts of legal scholars and social reformists to protect
privacy rights.
It is not that the law resists this contradiction-the law embraces it. A
remarkably vivid example may be found in the Supreme Court decision Stanley
v. Georgia. We have the right, according to that case, to possess obscenity in
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our homes.3 But of course we can be thrown in jail for buying or downloading
obscene materials, even if we are doing so for use within our homes.4 In other
words, we can be prosecuted for obtaining what we have a right to possess.
Someday, future generations of legal scholars will either laugh or fall silent in
perplexity at the fact that our system could embrace these two propositions
simultaneously. But for now, so long as we have a legal system that does
embrace these two positions, we are ill-advised to cling to the expectation that
our privacy will be sacrosanct, or even that invasions will be less than routine.
On the contrary, within such a system, it has to be expected that people will
exercise their supposed right to look at obscenity in their homes and that police
will pry into their homes or their computers to see how they obtained it.
But there is another, related contradiction between the public and private in
our law today. In public life, a new right is coming into being, and this new
right is coming to occupy a core position in contemporary society. Call it the
right to be treated as an object. In the workplace, for example, we demand the
right to be treated without regard for our race, sex, ethnicity, religion, sexual
orientation, ethnicity, and so on. We demand that employers be blind to these
things. They cannot make any decision on the basis of these features of our
personhood. They should not comment about them. They should act as if these
features simply do not exist.
Consider that these features, which are not supposed to be noticed, are some
of the most important things that make us the persons we are. By contrast, if our
employers evaluate us exactly as they would evaluate a machine, looking at us
solely as embodied net marginal product, they have discharged their legal duty.
They have done us justice. That is what I mean by the right to be treated as an
object.
This stripping away of our subjectivity extends far beyond employment law.
In fact, this preference for objectification governs our public life. In public we
are not supposed to comment upon-not supposed to notice, even-the race,
gender, sex, religion, or wealth of an individual. Those aspects of a person-and
the ideas that spring to our minds about those aspects-are not supposed to
exist. Those aspects and our reactions to them do not disappear, of course. We
are allowed to be who we really are in private. In fact, we have a right to be
racist or sexist or religiously intolerant in our thoughts and in our private lives.
But all of that is supposed to disappear in public. We are subjects in private, but
objects in public.
3. See id. at 559 ("[W]e agree that the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitution-
ally be made a crime."); see also id. at 564 ("Moreover, in the context of this case-a prosecution for
mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own home-that right takes on
an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.").
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There can be no question here of being against discrimination law in any
straightforward sense. Instead, the question concerns how our legal and social
worlds interact. We began a crusade against discrimination years ago with the
idea that every individual has a right to be treated as a person, a subject. But this
crusade has ended in a different place. It has ended with a right to be treated as
an object. What is going on here?
What has happened is no accident. Consider the most influential book of
political theory since the Second World War, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice.5
Rawls teaches us that we can attain true morality and justice by placing
ourselves in an original position where race, sex, religion, wealth-again, all
attributes of ourselves that make us the persons we are-are stripped away.
Of course, the overarching idea behind all this is to treat each individual with
respect, but somehow we have come to a point where people have become
objects of respect. It is as if we can only conceptualize the idea of fundamental
rights by engaging in the same kind of dehumanization that the whole concept
of fundamental rights was intended to oppose.
If it is true that we have embarked on a campaign of self-objectification in
our public lives, the implications of this development are profound, and the
implications for privacy particularly so. The objectification that is required of us
in public exerts too much pressure on our private lives. Our private lives cannot
absorb all of our subjectivity, the whole of our personhood. Accordingly, this
subjectivity is always bursting out of its closet, whether in the form of sexual
liaisons at work, racially tinged comments among corporate directors, or even
senseless killings in schools. And then the police, the courts, the media, can
only respond by doing their job, which is to say, by intruding into people's
privacy. Legal, moral, and commercial imperatives will all conspire to produce
this result. The police and the media will have a duty to violate our privacy. In
the name of the law, of morality, and of consumer demand, journalists and
prosecutors will do whatever it takes to find out whether people are illegally
seeking sex at work, talking about race where they were not supposed to have
racially tinged conversations, looking at the wrong pictures on their home
computers, or saying things that they should not say in their e-mail.
5. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
HeinOnline -- 89 Geo. L.J. 2101 2000-2001
HeinOnline -- 89 Geo. L.J. 2102 2000-2001
